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THE BABY BREAK: AN ANALYSIS OF SUSTAINED FERTILITY DECLINE AFTER A 
PERIOD OF ECONOMIC TURBULENCE 
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The United States fertility rate declined sharply during the Great Recession that lasted from 
2007-2009. Now a decade removed from the recession, I examine current fertility rates to see if 
they have rebounded to pre-recession levels. I use 5-year American Community Survey data to 
compare 2013-2018 fertility rates to 2006-2010 fertility rates at the county level across the 
United States. Variables such as race, region, education, median household income, the urban-
rural continuum and USDA county typologies were analyzed to analyze fertility trends in 
different types of counties across the country. Fertility declined 9.5% over the observed time 
period. Counties with high Hispanic populations are experiencing higher fertility declines than 
White or Black communities. The results of this study indicate that fertility rates are not 
recovering after the decline that occurred during the Great Recession. Instead, many women are 
having fewer children than they would in generations before, leading to a faster decline in 





The Great Depression is widely considered to be the most devastating economic period of 
United States history. The United States has experienced thirteen periods of economic recession 
since then, and the Great Recession that occurred last decade has proved to be the most impactful 
on the average American life (Pew Research Center 2010). The National Bureau of Economic 
Research declared that the Great Recession began in December 2007, and ended in June 2009, 
marking a turbulent 18 months that affected many households across the country (National 
Bureau of Economic Research 2010). In 2010, total private employment was six percent lower 
than in December 2007, illustrating how the American public still felt the effects of the recession 
years after it ended (Eberts 2011). Now, over a decade after the beginning of the recession, most 
workers have recovered as the economy became more stable (Kalleberg & von Wachter 2017). 
While the recession was officially declared over economically, key demographic trends such as 
fertility and migration rates can be examined to ascertain if the country has truly recovered 
demographically from the economic downturn. 
 When looking at the lasting impact of the Great Recession, the demographic structure of 
the country remains altered long after the stock market recovered. A historic stream of rural 
youth moving to urban areas temporarily halted, leaving many rural youths without the means to 
make the transition out of their hometowns (Johnson, Kurtis & Egan-Robertson 2017). This rural 
youth slowdown was caused by rising unemployment and diminished job markets in urban areas 
that are typical landing spots for this demographic. Rural youth during an economic recession 
have less access to the jobs in urban cores and surrounding suburbs that they normally have. This 
resulted in youth being stuck in rural areas, waiting for the economy to improve and for 
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opportunities to be created. Migration for all Americans slowed down during the Recession, due 
to the depressed home values kept many families stuck in place (Johnson, Kurtis, & Egan-
Robertson 2017). 
While domestic migration patterns are beginning to return to pre-recession patterns, the 
fertility rates of the country have not recovered. Fertility rates in the country have been dropping 
since the Recession began in 2008. Comparisons to the fertility rate of 2007 shows that there 
have been 6.6 million forgone births between the years of 2008-2019 (Johnson 2020). Data for 
foregone births is calculated by taking the difference between projected births and actual births. 
Projected births is measured by the 2007 age specific fertility rates multiplied by the total 
number of women of child bearing age in a given year (Johnson 2020). The fertility rates of 
young women declined significantly more than fertility rates of older women during the Great 
Recession, which could suggest that this is just a case of birth deferment instead of foregone 
births (Cherlin et al. 2013). However, the continued slow drop-in fertility rate now almost a 
decade after the Great Recession indicates that women are having less children than prior 
generations. 
This thesis will attempt to analyze whether there are patterns amongst the counties in the 
United States that are experiencing differential decrease or increases in fertility. While it is noted 
that fertility is declining across the country, it remains to be seen whether there are parts of 
America that are facing less decline, or even fertility increases. Current literature highlights the 
drops in fertility across the country but does not examine the sub-regional trends in how this 







Natural increase is determined by the total number of births subtracted from the total 
number of deaths. Natural increase varies in societies based on their stage of development, which 
leads to several key demographic transitions. Warren Thompson created the demographic 
transition model in 1929, which has been refined over the years. The demographic transition 
attempts to explain population changes as countries become more developed and is the dominant 
model for explaining changing fertility rates in modern societies (Thompson 1929). Early 
societies are in Stage 1 of demographic transition, where birth and death rates are particularly 
high. This is seen in many preindustrial societies. Women tend to have a very large number of 
births, but many children do not survive to adulthood, and life expectancies are shorter during 
these time frames. Stage 2 of demographic transition is marked by birth rates continuing to be 
high while the death rate begins rapidly falling, this is common when cultures become 
modernized and make technological advancements. Stage 3 marks the beginning of birth rate 
decline in a culture. As members of a culture continue to live longer, the death rate continues to 
decline but does so significantly more slowly than in Stage 2. (Van dee Kaa 1987).  
Stage 4 sees a stabilization of both low birth rates and low death rates. Natural increase in 
this stage is minimal, and in some instances represents the beginning of natural decrease within a 
country (Van dee Kaa 1987). Approaching Stage 4 of demographic transition can create concerns 
for governments. If experiencing natural decrease, a government would have to rely on an inflow 
of migrants in order to maintain or grow the country’s population. The United States and other 
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developed nations are currently in Stage 4 of demographic transition (Tamir 2019). Countries in 
Stage 4 demographic transition also feature an overall aging population, which can lead to policy 
questions of how to fund programs such as social security when those at retirement age of the 
country become a larger percentage of the overall population. 
Changing Fertility Statistics 
There are two key fertility measures that help outline the state of America’s current 
fertility situation. The first measure is general fertility rate (GFR), the measure of births per 
thousand women aged 15-44 each year. In contrast, the total fertility rate (TFR) attempts to 
represent current age-specific fertility patterns. This measure is hypothetical and created using 
projections based on information about current fertility among women at each age. Both general 
fertility rate (59.0) and total fertility rate (1.73) hit all-time lows in 2018 (Livingston 2019). The 
fertility of older women declined the least during the Great Recession, while younger women 
saw larger declines in fertility (Cherlin, Morgan & Wilber 2013).  
  The ideal family size in American has shifted over time as well. When asked about what 
Americans view the “ideal” family to be, 48% say that they believe the ideal family size is two 
children, while barely any respondents believed the ideal family is to have one child or be 
childless (Newport & Wilke 2013). This represents a shift from the mid-1900’s, when three 
children families were considered the ideal family size (Newport & Wilke 2013). This reported 
“ideal” household size is quite different than the actual American households. While two-
children families are on the rise compared to the 1970s, rates of childlessness and one child 
families are also increasing (Livingston 2015). This indicates that the public perception of what 
an “ideal” family should be is not represented in actual family trends in American families. The 
rates of having four or more children have plummeted in recent decades, being replaced by two-
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children households (Livingston 2015). The increasing rates of childless or only having one child 
also indicate that the fertility rate is dropping. With fewer women opting for four or more 
children, the United States has a fertility rate that is below the level of replacement. Despite these 
changes in family size, over ninety percent of American adults say they want children (Newport 
& Wilke 2013).  
Social Influences 
A shift in culture over the past decade could also have led to this decline in fertility 
among the millennial generation. Humans are social actors and are continually influenced by 
their peers. An analysis of intended pregnancies shows that individuals are more likely to decide 
to have a child shortly after a close friend has a child (Balbo & Barban 2014). Seeing peers go 
through the pregnancy process could help couples decide that they are ready to have children. As 
the fertility rate decreases, fewer couples will experience peer group influence that could lead 
them to decide it is the right time to have children. 
 In the continued discussion of whether births are being delayed or foregone, changing 
rates of marriage and cohabitation are a relevant social change that could be impacting fertility 
rates. Marriage rates have declined over the past several decades, and the Great Recession 
brought significant declines in marriage (Cherlin et al. 2013). High rates of divorce and rising 
cohabitation rates have led some to question whether the institution of marriage is as valued by 
current American young adults. Prior generations did not view cohabitation favorably, but 
cohabitation rates and acceptance of cohabitation have risen in recent decades, especially during 
times of economic hardship (Cherlin et al. 2013).  
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Cohabitation continues to be a popular living arrangement for a younger generation as 
they navigate the difficulty of reaching adulthood in a post-Great Recession economy that never 
seemed to recover for the average American. Many couples are delaying marriage and instead 
opting into cohabitating. The main driver behind this decision is that couples feel ready to get 
married,  do not feel they have the economic stability that they view as a necessity for getting 
married (Smock, Manning & Porter 2005). A lack of economically attractive marriageable men 
is also a driver of lower marriage rates (Lichter et al. 1992). Nonmarital fertility is rising, and is 
mainly occurring between cohabitating couples (Lichter, Sassler & Turner 2015). While 
cohabitation is rising, most births still occur among married couples. The increase in 
cohabitation could lead to shifting social norms that make it more socially acceptable for 
children to be born out of wedlock. It remains to be seen if the rise of cohabitation is causing 
women to delay having children, in which case the fertility rates of the country could rebound in 
the coming years. However, with drops in fertility continuing over the past decade, this seems 
increasingly doubtful.  
Cultural expectations of motherhood can also weigh on women who are deciding whether 
to have children or not. American mothers are expected to put significant effort into both their 
home life and their work life, causing mothers to feel unable to commit the appropriate amount 
of time to either (Collins 2019). Women acting as a breadwinner for the family became more 
common during the Great Recession, as rising unemployment during the recession mainly 
affected male dominated fields (Smith 2010). The stress that mothers experience is noted by 
women who have yet to have children, as reflected in their view of motherhood as an intensive 
and overwhelming process (Maher & Saugeres 2007). When this is coupled with diminishing 
7 
 
fertility among friend groups, the combination could discourage childless women from having 
children.  
The United States is one of the few developed nations without strong family care 
policies. The lack of family care policies such as paid family leave and universal pre-K childcare 
has tangible effects; parents in America are unhappier in comparison to their childless peers 
(Glass, Simon & Andersson 2016). While this phenomenon is true in all advanced industrialized 
societies, it is particularly significant in the United States which has the largest happiness gap 
between parents and non-parents. The happiness gap is created by significant stress that comes 
with being a parent. However, research suggests that advanced industrialized societies with the 
stronger federal laws regarding family policy have smaller happiness gaps. This is achieved by 
the happiness of parents tending to increase, while the happiness of nonparents is not affected 
(Glass, Simon & Andersson 2016). These findings suggest that the United States could improve 
the welfare of parents by instituting family support policies that are standard in much of the 
developed world.  
Economic Influences 
Both economic and social conditions have changed in the United States over the past 
seventy years with the rise in women’s participation in the workforce. In 1950 women 
represented only 29.6% of the workforce, while today women comprise 46.9% of the workforce 
(Fry & Stepler 2017). This change had significant ramifications for fertility in America. The 
heightened career aspirations of women are one of the common causes of drops in fertility that 
come with Stage 3 of the demographic transition (Van de Kaa 1987). Balancing career and 
family obligations is difficult for most women, as both these institutions are viewed as “greedy 
institutions” (Coser 1974). These “greedy institutions” are both significantly demanding of a 
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mother’s time because they require significant commitment. This leaves many potential mothers 
in a quagmire; do they choose to focus on raising a family or on growing their career? 
As women’s participation in the workforce increased, American’s ideal family size began 
shifting toward two children instead of four or more (Gao 2015). This shift in economic 
condition towards two income households left many adults unable to find the time to care for 
children. Additionally, stagnant wage growth also contributed towards this shift towards wanting 
fewer children. Real wages have stagnated for the average worker, leaving them with 
significantly less purchasing power than they would have had in the 1950’s (Desilber 2018). The 
stagnation of wages combined with the increasing cost of raising a child has made it increasingly 
difficult for families to be able to afford to have children. While desire for children remains 
strong in the United States (Newport & Wilke 2013), it can leave many parents in a bind; they 
want to have children but do not have the means to afford to raise them. This could lead families 
to have fewer children than they would like, or not have children at all. Improved economic 
conditions for all could lead to a bounce in the fertility rate, as families would have more 
economic flexibility to have children  without having to question whether having a child is the 
right economic decision.  
 There are distinct differences between women in the workforce who decide to have 
children and those who do not. Women in jobs that have significant autonomy, complexity and 
prestige are more likely to delay having children, if they decide to have children at all (Shreffler 
2016). Meanwhile, women who work in jobs with less prestige are more likely to not wait to 
have children (Shreffler 2016). Women with higher status jobs could feel increased pressure to 
advance in their career, and thus to to wait for the right time to have children. They may also 
delay having children in order to build up economic resources and social capital to have an easier 
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transition into parenthood when the time comes. Women in lower status jobs may feel 
unrewarded in their field, making it easier to focus on becoming a mother than career 
advancement. Additionally, they would have a much more difficult time building resources to 
ease the transition towards parenthood, which could explain why they do not delay having 
children due to career influences.  
A perilous economic situation further complicates a family’s decision to have children. 
Although the Great Recession was declared over in 2010 by economists, many parents continue 
to grapple with difficult financial decisions. It is widely believed that the main reasons that 
families are not having more children is due to not concerns about the cost of children and the 
current labor market (Newport & Wilke 2013). Historically, when unemployment rises, the 
fertility rate tends to fall (Currie & Schwandt 2014). This held true with recent economic 
downturns in the United States; states that suffered large increases in unemployment during the 
Great Recession also had the highest reductions in fertility rates (Cherlin et al. 2013). The 
normal occurrence during times of increased unemployment is that births are just postponed, 
women wait until they are in a financially stable situation to have children. However, since the 
Great Recession, fertility rates have not recovered. Because fertility rates have not improved 
since the Great Recession, there have 6.6 million foregone births since 2007 (Johnson 2020). 
The uneasy financial climate that arose from the Great Recession has made families tepid 
about having a child, given the associated financial responsibility. The average cost of raising a 
child is $233,610, not including assisting a child with college education (Lino 2017). With such 
high costs associated with parenthood, it makes sense that families would wait before having 
children until their situation is more economically viable. Countries that suffer from long term 
unemployment typically have a culture where childbearing occurs later in life, since the 
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economic means needed for child rearing have not yet been obtained (Adsera 2005). As young 
Americans are struggling to obtain the economic means to get married (Smock, Manning & 
Porter 2005), the economic commitment necessary to have a child is even further out of reach.  
 The falling fertility rates in America is the result of a multitude of factors that could be 
dissuading young people from having children. The economic situation of many young people is 
causing them delay having children, as raising children is more of an economic burden than in 
generations prior. Meanwhile, social norms seem to be shifting towards families having fewer 
children, while the federal government does not institute any policies to make the transition 
easier for prospective parents. 
 The net result of this could  be a generational shift toward delayed births. More women 
could be choosing to have children in their late thirties and early forties, but there is not currently 
enough data from the Great Recession to see if a rebounding of fertility rate will occur. Overall, 
this seems less likely given that is has been a decade since the Great Recession and fertility rates 
continue to decline. While fertility declines have been common during economic recessions, the 
Great Recession represents the first-time fertility rates have not rebounded as economic 
conditions improve. This is due to the variety of social and policy factors outlined above, as well 
as  to growing economic inequality throughout the nation.  
 To understand why fertility rates have declined, it is important to learn which types of 
women are having fewer children. For example, are rural or urban mothers more likely to have 
fewer children or opt out of parenthood entirely? What effect does education have on number of 
children women tend to have? Looking at these metrics could help to create effective polices that 
create conditions for women in these demographic sub-groups that provides them with the 
opportunity to have children again. Existing data shows that women who struggle financially 
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navigate a tougher road to motherhood than those that are well off. If income inequality 
continues to grow, this will continue to affect more women of childbearing age who want to be 
mothers. 
This study addresses the difficult challenge of untangling the decline in fertility. A 
multitude of factors could be contributing to the fertility decline. In order to contribute to the 
literature, this study examines a multitude of county level variables in order to further understand 

















 To analyze current fertility trends across sub-regions of the country, I compiled 
secondary quantitative data from various government agencies. Final birth data from the 
National Center for Health Statistics is used to analyzed trends in United States modern fertility 
rates (Brady et al. 2015, Martin et al. 2019). The live birth data includes every birth certificate 
registered across the country. This final birth data highlights recent nationwide fertility trends 
before discussing trends with the county level data from the American Community Survey.  
 The bulk of data is from 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau. The 2010 and 2018 ACS datasets were selected to be the comparison points for 
the study. The 2010 5-year ACS encompasses the entirety of the Great Recession (2008-2010) 
and includes the immediate years preceding it (2006,2007).  It is the oldest five-year dataset 
available. The 2018 5-year dataset is the most recent dataset available at the time and ranges 
from 2014-2018. The 2018 dataset will highlight any fertility recovery or decline since the end of 
the Great Recession. With economists declaring the recession over mid-2009, the economy had 
several years to recover, allowing families to resume having children at rates similar to the pre-
recession if they so desired. (National Bureau of Economic Research 2010). 
 Fertility rates were calculated using data from the ACS. The general fertility rate is 
calculated for each county using the following formula: 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒 15 − 44
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒 15 − 44
 𝑋 1000 
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 Some researchers use 15-49 to calculate a general fertility rate. However, when ACS 
provides age-based birth data it includes 45-50 instead of a group for 45-49. As a result, the 
maximum age used in this study is 44, which is congruent with other fertility studies.  
Variables 
 The states were sorted into 4 regions: Northeast, Midwest, South and West. These 
categories were determined by the Census Bureau official region designations. The metropolitan 
variables were created using a condensed version of the 2013 USDA Rural-Urban Continuum 
Codes (USDA 2013). The original 9 codes established by the USDA have been condensed into 4 
categories used for this study: Big Metro, Small Metro, Nonmetro Adjacent, and Nonmetro 
Nonadjacent. Big Metro (N=472) counties are part of a metropolitan area that includes a 
population of one million or more. Small metro (N=763) counties are part of a metropolitan area 
that has a population of less than one million. Nonmetro Adjacent (N=1034) counties are not part 
of a metropolitan area but are adjacent to a metropolitan area. Nonmetro Nonadjacent (N=950) 
counties are not a part of or adjacent to any metropolitan area.  
 Race is represented by the 2010 racial compositions of the county, with attempts to 
ensure minimal overlapping between groups. White counties were designated as counties that 
had a non-Hispanic White population of at least 75% (N=2101). Black counties are those with a 
non-Hispanic Black population of as more than 25% of the total population (N=405). Hispanic 
counties were similarly labeled as such is the county is more than 25% Hispanic (N=321). It is 
important to note that there is potential in the data set to have a county count for both the Black 
and Hispanic counties, since the variables were non-exclusive. However, there is only one 
instance on this among the 3219 counties that are included in the data. Finally, a diverse category 
includes any counties that did not fit the criteria of the three other race categories (N=393). 
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 To measure socioeconomic status, median household income and percent of residents 
with a bachelor’s degree or higher were obtained through the 2010 ACS. For median household 
income, the poorest bracket were counties that had a median income of $34,999 or lower 
(N=636). The next two categories are $35,000-$44,999 (N=1384) and $45,000-$54,999 
(N=760). The highest measure of median household income in a county were counties that had a 
median household income of $55,000+ (N=439). Since these variables are taken in 2010, median 
household incomes seem low since the five-year measure includes the Great Recession.  
 The percent college graduate variable includes any resident of a county aged 25 or older 
that has obtained at least a bachelor’s degree. The lowest group for this variable are counties who 
have less than 15% of the population with a degree (N=797). The remaining groups are: 15-20% 
(N=936), 20-30% (N=653), and 30%+ (N=833). Like the median household income variable, 
these numbers may seem lower than expected since they are based on the 2010 ACS. The 2018 
ACS indicates that the percentage of adults over the age of 25 has increased.  
 Six different economic dependence typologies from the USDA were used in the analysis 
in addition to one USDA policy-relevant code for retirement destination. The most recent county 
typology codes were released in 2015 and use employment and economic data from 2010-2012 
to classify these counties (USDA 2019). Counties were labeled farming-dependent if 25%+ of 
the counties earning were generated from farming or if farming represented 16% or more of the 
county employment. Mining counties were counties that had 13%+ of earnings or 8%+ of 
employment generated from the field. Manufacturing is responsible for at least 23% of county 
earnings or at least 16% of employment in manufacturing-dependent counties. Government 
counties have a high presence of federal or state of employment, accounting for 14% or more of 
county earnings and 9% or more of unemployment (USDA 2019).  
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Recreation counties are classified in a different manner than other economic 
classifications. For recreation counties, an analysis is run using the percentage of employment in 
the county in entertainment and recreation positions, restaurants/bar industry and real estate. 
Additionally, the percent of total income in the county from recreation industries from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis is weighted, and finally the percentage of housing units in the 
county intended for vacant or seasonal housing. The three variables are combined into a 
weighted index of z-scores and those with a scores and those with a score of .67 or higher are 
classified as recreation counties. Nonspecialized counties are those that did not qualify for any of 
the five prior categories. Finally, retirement destination counties are those that experienced a 
15% or higher growth in residents over the age of 60 from 2000 to 2010 (USDA 2019). The 
USDA methodology can create scenarios where there is overlap between recreation and 
retirement counties. Counties that did not meet any of the typologies are classified as non-
specialized. These counties have diverse and balanced economies. Many metropolitan counties 
are classified as non-specialized.  
 The descriptive data portion of the study highlights the change in fertility rates and lost 
births that are created drops in fertility. Lost births are calculated by taking the 2010 ACS 
fertility rate and multiplying it by the population of childbearing age in a county according to the 
2018 ACS. By subtracting the actual births from the projected births, it gives us the total of lost 
births that a county experienced due to declines in the fertility rate.  
 The analytic portion of the results covers linear regression models for 2010 Fertility, 
2018 Fertility and Change in Fertility. Within these regressions are models that incorporate the 
region, urban/rural, race, USDA economic typologies and the SES variables to attempt to explain 
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both where the fertility rates are higher and which counties are experiencing greater declines in 





Descriptive Data Analysis 
 
 Figure 1 uses live birth data from the NCHS to showcase how the number of births and 
fertility rates have changed since 2000. Projected number of births is calculated by multiplying 
the number of women childbearing age each year by the 2000 fertility rate. Numbers of births 
peaked in 2007 at 4.3 million births. Number of births quickly declined during the Great 
Recession, dropping to 4 million in 2010, when the recession ended. So far, there has been no 
























































Figure 1. Actual number of births in America since 2000 compared 
to projected births based on 2000 fertility rates
Number of Actual Births
Number of Projeted Births (2000 Fertility Rate)
18 
 
 Number of total births were steadily rising before the Great Recession. The fertility rate 
in the country peaked in 2007, at 69.3 births per thousand. Fertility increased during the year 
preceding the recession, when the United States had general economic prosperity. The onset of 
the Great Recession quickly erased the gains in fertility and total number of births. In 2018, the 
3.8 million births represent a rapid decline in the total number of births. The decrease in births 
cannot be attributed to a reduction of women of childbearing age. Women ages 15-44 were 
increasing during this time period, which should have resulted in an increase in births if fertility 
rates had stayed constant. The result of this decline in fertility is millions of lost births when 
compared to fertility rates right before the recession (Johnson 2019).  









Figures 2 and 3 illustrate county fertility rates obtained from the 2010 and 2018 5-year 
American Community Survey. From these maps, we can observe general trends that are present 
in the data. The center point of the legend (light red) represents the median fertility rates from the 
2010 ACS. In Figure 2, it can be observed that the higher fertility rates stretch across the 
Midwest in more rural areas. In addition to that, Utah, a state with a high Mormon population, 
also has relatively high fertility compared to the rest of the country. Meanwhile, the Northeast 
has below average fertility. Big metropolitan areas, such as New York metropolitan area, and the 
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San Francisco-San Jose-Oakland metropolitan areas also have below average fertility. Southern 
California, which has a high Hispanic population, has largely above average fertility.  
 Figure 3 provides a visual representation of declined fertility in 2018, compared to the 
2010 median fertility rate. Utah, which had high statewide fertility in 2010, now has counties 
with below average fertility rate. The Midwest continues to have predominantly above average 
fertility and the Northeast still has low fertility. Some areas in the Northeast now show above 
average fertility, particularly northern Maine and New Hampshire. The South had many counties 
that had above average fertility rates in 2010 now below that median in 2018. The metropolitan 
areas have even lower fertility rates, particularly Long Island is now a dark red and there is 
below average fertility all around the San Francisco metropolitan area. Southern California has 




 Figure 4 visualizes fertility change from 2010 to 2018. The largest concentration of 
fertility gain comes from the largely rural Mid-West portion of the country. Additionally, many 
counties throughout the Midwest had the most concentrated gains in fertility. The Northeast also 
has a sizeable amount of their counties experiencing fertility gain, although that is mainly in the 
more rural areas and overall fertility is low in the region (Figure 3). Counties that feature 
metropolitan areas also experienced fertility decline between the two observed periods. Long 
Island, in addition to Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle metropolitan areas experienced 
notable declines in fertility. All southern California experienced declines in fertility, as did many 
counties along the U.S.-Mexico border. States with a high percentage of Black residents, such as 
Louisiana and Mississippi also experienced large drops in fertility.  
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 1,797 counties experienced fertility decline between 2010 and 2018, while 1,394 counties 
experienced no change or an increase in fertility. The general fertility rate for the entire country 
from the 2010 ACS is 67.8, and the 2018 fertility rate is 61.3. This marks a 9.5% decline in 
fertility in under a decade. Births fell 7.8% during this time period, while the population of 
women childbearing age increased by 1.9% The decline in number of births despite an increase 
































 Figure 5 shows the changes in fertility rate for the four different regions of the country, as 
designated by the Census Bureau. All four regions experienced declines in fertility. The West 
experienced the largest decline in fertility rate, falling 13.4%. This decline in fertility is caused 
by the West experiencing a 9.1% drop in births, while also seeing the population of women 
childbearing age increase 5.0%.  As noted in the maps, many rural counties in the Midwest did 
not appear to experience declines. The Midwest experienced the smallest decline in fertility rate, 
at 5.8%. Births in the Midwest dropped 7.6% between the two time periods while the population 
of women child-bearing age also declined by 1.8%.  In 2010, the South had the highest fertility 
rate out of the regions (69.5), while in 2018 the Midwest ended up with the highest fertility rate 
(64.6). The Northeast experienced a smaller decline in fertility (7.3%), however the Northeast 



















Figure 6. Actual 2018 Births Compared to Projected Births 
By Region
Actual Births Projected Births
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 Figure 6 represents the actual number of births in 2018 compared to the projected births 
using 2010 fertility rates. The gap between these variables represents lost births that did not 
occur due to declining fertility rates. The South and West account for the most lost births at 
159,327 and 129,781 respectively. Since the Northeast and Midwest overall had a lower amount 
of births, their declines in fertility contributed less to the aggregate lost births. For the country as 
a whole, the 2018 ACS averaged 3.94 million births per year. However, using projections based 





































 Figure 7 shows how counties of all metropolitan status are experiencing declines in 
fertility. The big metropolitan areas are the ones that are experiencing the most notable declines 
in fertility, declining 11.14%, from a fertility rate of 66.5 to 59.1 Rural adjacent counties saw the 
smallest drop-in fertility rates at 3.35%, dropping from 73.8 births per thousand to 69.1. Both 
rural adjacent and non-adjacent counties experienced higher declines (8.12% and 9.85%) in 
number of births than did the big and small metropolitan areas (8.06% and 6.76%). The rural 
counties experienced lower declines in fertility rate because they also saw a reduction in women 
of childbearing age. The metropolitan areas are experiencing larger declines in fertility due to 
seeing a reduction in total number of births while also having their population of childbearing 
age women increase. Overall, all four metropolitan types experienced declines in fertility, but the 
















Figure 8. Actual 2018 Births Compared to 
Projected Births by Metropolitian Status
Actual Births Projected Births
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 Figure 8 demonstrates how shifts in the fertility rates changed the number of actual births 
across the different metropolitan areas. Big metropolitan areas account for over 250,000 lost 
births per year, which is more than the other metropolitan types combined. Both rural adjacent 
and rural non-adjacent counties each accounted for less than 15,000 lost births per year. The big 
metropolitan areas have the most women childbearing age 36.9 million, while the other 
metropolitan areas have a combined 27.3 million. Having larger populations of women 
childbearing age leads to a greater number of lost births when fertility rates decline. The big 
urban core counties will be the first to experience ramifications from declining fertility rates. 
Since the other metropolitan types have much smaller populations, the changes to these areas as 
a result of declining fertility might take longer to manifest. The metropolitan areas are gaining 

































 Figure 9 highlights how fertility rates have changed across USDA economic and policy-
relevant variables. Out of all the types analyzed, farming counties experienced the lowest decline 
in fertility, experiencing only a 1% decline from 2010 to 2018. Farming counties also have the 
highest fertility rates of the USDA typology. Many of these farming counties are in the Midwest, 
which is still experiencing high fertility rates in 2018 (Figure 5). Recreation and retirement 
counties experience the largest drops in fertility rates at 10.5% and 10.9% respectively. The 
diminished fertility rate in retirement destination counties is more a function of a large influx of 
women aged 15-44, as that increased by 8.4% from 2010 to 2018. The drop of fertility in 
recreation counties came largely from drops in number of births, which declined 8.2%. All 
















Figure 10. Actual 2018 Births Compared to Projected 
Births by USDA Typology 

































Figure 11. Fertility Rates in 2010 and 2018 By County 
Racial Composition
2010 2018
 While farming counties have high fertility ratings, the 472 farming counties only had a 
combined 50,679 births in 2018. When analyzing lost births, farming counties only had a deficit 
of 483. Like the rural adjacent and non-adjacent counties in Figure 7, farming counties have had 
their population of childbearing age women decline by 3.7%. The faming counties have a total 
population of women childbearing age of 663,210 in 2010. The next smallest cohort of women 
childbearing age is in the mining counties, where the 256 counties have a population of 2.2 
million women childbearing age. The farming counties represent some of the most rural parts of 
the country, with many small communities. The overwhelming majority of lost births from the 
USDA typology variables comes from the nonspecialized counties. These non-specialized 
counties had 289,692 lost births per year across the observed time period. 1,235 counties were 
designated non-specialized, which is more than double any of the specialize counties. 
Additionally, many big metropolitan counties are labeled nonspecialized due to the mixed 
















Figure 11 highlights how fertility rates have changed based on the racial composition of 
the county. Counties with a high Hispanic population had the biggest decline in fertility, with 
fertility rates dropping 14.1%. Hispanic counties had the highest fertility rates among the race 
variables observed in 2010 at 70.0 births per thousand women of child-bearing age, and by 2018 
had the lowest at 60.2 births per thousand. Black counties experienced a 10.1% decline in 
fertility rates. Meanwhile, counties that were over 75% White only had a 4.7% decline in 
fertility. This is in part due to white counties having a lower fertility rate (66.0) than Hispanic 
(70.0) or Black (68.7) counties in 2010. This decline corresponds with regional trends in fertility 
declines seen in Figure 5. The Northeast, which has more counties over 75% white, did not have 
major declines in fertility. Meanwhile, counties in the South and West, which has large Black 
and Hispanic populations, experienced greater declines in fertility. In terms of number of births, 
























Figure 12. Actual 2018 Births Compared to Projected 
Births
Actual Births Projected Births
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The White counties saw a slight decline in the number of women of childbearing age at 
.5%. The Black counties also saw minimal change in their population of women of childbearing 
age, with an increase of .3%. The Hispanic counties saw the largest increase in women of 
childbearing age at 4.4%. This makes the declines in fertility rate most notable for the Hispanic 
counties, as they experienced both greater declines in number of births and the largest increase of 
population of women ages 15-44. 
 Counties with large Hispanic populations accounted for 159,327 lost births among the 
race variables, and diverse counties accounted for 124,426 lost births. Hispanic counties saw 
large fertility rate declines as a result of declining total number of births and increase in 
population of women childbearing age.  White counties, despite having significantly more total 
births, only had 68,722 lost births in 2018 due to the smaller decline in fertility rates. White 
counties had lower decline in fertility rate in part because they experienced a decline in 
population of women childbearing age. The decline in total number of births were similar to 
Black and Hispanic counties.  Counties with large Black populations counties accounted for a 
similar amount of lost births (64,448) compared to White counties, despite these counties having 

























































Figure 14. Actual 2018 Births Compared to Projected 
Births By County Median Household Income 
Actual Births Projected Births
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Figures 13 through 16 describe the SES variables used in the study, median household 
income and percentage of residents that have a college degree. Figure 13 demonstrates how 
fertility rates changed based on median household income. In 2010, fertility rate remained 
relatively similar among counties when stratified by median household income. The wealthiest 
counties, with a median income of $55,000 and higher had the lowest fertility rate at 66.2 births 
per thousand. These counties then suffered at 11.2% decline in fertility by 2018, lowering to a 
rate of 58.8.  Many of these wealthier counties are in urban areas, which experienced more 
fertility decline in comparison to rural counties. The poorest counties, those with a median 
household income of $35,000 or lower, experienced the biggest drop in fertility. These counties 
experienced a 14.3% drop in fertility, fertility rates fell from 68.1 in 2010 to 58.4 by 2018. These 
poor counties had a 20.4% decline in births during that time period, while also seeing the 
population of women of childbearing age decline by 7.1%. The wealthier counties saw an 
increase of 3.7% of their childbearing aged women.  
 Figure 14 shows the gap in lost births across median household income. Despite the 
poorest counties having the highest decline in fertility rates, the richest counties have the highest 
population of women of childbearing age, leading to the greater number of lost births. The 
wealthiest counties experienced 201,749 lost births a year in the comparison of the two sets of 
ACS data. Lost births were similarly greater for the $45,000-55,000 group (107,765) than the 
$35,000-45,000 group (70,392) due to more women living in the wealthier counties. While the 
poorest counties experienced the largest drop in fertility, this does not have a large impact in the 
lost births across the country. There were more poorer counties (N=636) than the wealthy 
counties (N=439). The wealthy counties had a population of 26.3 million childbearing age 
women in 2010, while the poorest counties had a population of 3.6 million. Any change to the 
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fertility rate in wealthier counties are going to have a greater impact on the overall fertility of the 
country. Additionally, a smaller generational cohort in America would more likely be the result 



























Figure 15. 2010 and 2018 Fertility Rate by Percent of Residents 





 Figures 15 and 16 sort the data by the percentage of residents in a county that have 
obtained a college degree or higher. The most educated counties (30% or more residents with a 
college degree) experienced the largest decline in fertility rate. The decline in fertility is a result 
of both a decline in actual number of births (7.2%) and an increase in the number of women that 
are childbearing age (3.6%) This resulted in a fertility rate decline of 10.4% in the most educated 
counties. These highly educated counties tend to be in urban areas, and additionally are wealthier 
counties. The poorest counties experienced the biggest decline in number of births at 11.6%, but 
also experienced a 5.8% decline in women that are childbearing age. The poorest counties had 
fertility rates drop from 74.1 to 69.6 births per thousand, a 6.2% decline in fertility rate.   
 313,234 lost births came from the most educated counties in 2018. Many of the 833 

















Figure 16. Actual Births Compared to Projected Births By Percent 
Of Residents with Bachelor Degrees or Higher
Actual Births Projected Births
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women of child-bearing age reside in these counties, more than the rest of the education groups 
combined. The highly educated counties were the only group to experience a significant increase 
in the population of women of child-bearing age, with a gain of 3.6%. In contrast, counties with 
0-15% and 15-20% with college degrees experienced drops in women of childbearing age (-5.8% 
and -2.6%), while the counties with 20-30% college educated had their population stay constant, 
with an increase of .01%.  
 Across this analysis there is widespread declines in fertility. When analyzing for region, 
race, USDA economic dependency typology, urban/rural split, education and income, every 
grouping experienced decline in fertility. The total number of births across the country is 
declining despite an increase in women of childbearing age. However, fertility is not impacted by 
single variables, but rather by the overall impact of all the variables analyzed so far. The 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Three multi-model regressions were run, one for 2010 fertility, 2018 fertility and fertility 
change. The first five models of each regression use identical independent variables. Model 1 
introduces dummy variables in South, Northeast and Midwest to demonstrate regional 
differences, with the excluded category being the West. Model 2 adds the urban rural continuum 
variables using dummy variables to represent Big Metropolitan, Small Metropolitan and 
Nonmetropolitan Adjacent counties, with Nonmetropolitan Nonadjacent as the excluded 
category in the model. Model 3 adds the USDA economic typology variables farming, mining 
and manufacturing.  The USDA variables for government, recreation, nonspecialized and 
retirement destinations were removed from regression models because they contributed no 
significant effect to the model. The race variables are introduced in Model 4, including variables 
for the percentage of the county population that is White, Black, and Hispanic. The SES 
variables for median household income and residents with a college degree are added in Model 
5. For the regressions analyzing 2018 fertility and fertility change, a sixth model adds 2010 
fertility as an independent variable. These models are also weighted by total county population in 
2010. This is a result of small rural counties having massive fluctuations in their fertility change 
variable. For example, Sierra County, California had a fertility rate of 6.83 (3 births) in the 2010 
dataset, and a 2018 fertility rate of 28.09 (10 births), creating a fertility change of 311.40%. The 
weight by total county population prevents smaller counties from skewing the overall data set. 
Table 1 shows the regression analysis for predicting 2010 fertility. In the final model, the 
independent variables were able to explain 18% of the variance of fertility in 2010. The model is 
a significant predictor of fertility (p=.000). The variables that were causing the greatest increase 
in fertility were median household income (β = .286) and Hispanic population (β = .206). North 
East counties (β =-.199) caused the biggest decline in the fertility among the four regions, 
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meanwhile Big Metro counties (β=-.219) had the largest decline amongst the regions. College 
degree obtainment has the largest negative effect on fertility (β=-.369). Every variable used in 
Model 5 is significant at the p<.001 level.  
 Among the race variables, the percent White variable (β =.053) had less of an effect on 
fertility than percent Black (β =.179) and percent Hispanic (β=.206). When controlling for 
factors such as region, SES and urban/rural life, it appears that being White leads to lower 
fertility than it does for Blacks or Hispanics. An additional interesting finding within Model 5 is 
how the two SES variables have distinctly different effects on the model. The bivariate 
correlation between the two variables is strong at .711 (p=.000). When these variables Median 
household income has a positive effect on fertility (β=.286), while college degree attainment has 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2 uses the same variables present in Table 1 and introduces a sixth model adding 
Fertility 2010 as an independent variable. Model 5 of Table 2 can explain 19.4% of the variance 
in fertility. The model is a significant predictor of fertility (p=.000). Variables that had the largest 
effect of fertility in 2018 were median household income (β = .221) and the Mid-West region (β 
= .112). Amongst the USDA economic typologies the mining communities had the largest 
standardized coefficient (β = .098). The variable that caused the biggest decline to the 2018 
fertility rate is the big metropolitan areas (β = -.059). Like the 2010 fertility model, the Northeast 
region has a negative effect on fertility (β = -.078).   
 The race variables had a smaller effect on the fertility rate in 2018 than in 2010. Most 
notably, the Hispanic variable now has a negative effect on fertility (β = -.009). The impact that 
the White (β = .010) and Black (β = .022) is also lower than they were in the 2010 fertility data. 
The explained variability is only raised slightly (.116 to .12) in the 2018 Fertility regression 
when the race variables were added in Model 4.  Earlier in the descriptive data, Figure 11 
highlighted how fertility declined across all racial categories. Any analysis of the 2018 fertility 
regression indicates that other changes in fertility by race could largely be explained by the SES 
variables. When the SES variables were added to the regression in Model 5, the co-efficient of 
the race variables were all reduced greatly.  
 The variable that had the most significant impact on 2018 fertility is 2010 fertility (β = 
.334). When introduced in Model 6, the explained variability rose from 19.4% to 28.5%. This is 
no surprise, while fertility declined across much of the country, those counties that had high 
fertility in 2010 still had relatively high fertility in 2018. Several variables had their co-efficient 
shift significantly with the inclusion of the fertility 2010 variable, including the White and Black 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3 is the regression analysis for the fertility change that occurred from 2010 to 2018. 
The explained variance for the dependent variables in Model 5 is .062. The inclusion of fertility 
2010 (β = 0.673) as a variable changed the explained variance to .393. This is to be expected, as 
throughout the descriptive data analysis the variables with the highest fertility experienced the 
greatest declines in fertility. In Model 5 of this regressions, before fertility 2010 is included, all 
the region and metropolitan variables had a positive standardized coefficient value, while the 
continuous variables all had negative standardized coefficients. North East counties had the 
largest positive standardized coefficient for fertility change. (β = .117). As mentioned in Figure 
5, the North East experienced the least fertility decline amongst the regions. The Hispanic 
variable had the lowest standardized coefficient (β = -0.203).  
Counties with high Hispanic populations were amongst the hardest hit from the declines 
in fertility, counties with a Hispanic population over 25% declined by 14.1%. After factoring in 
the SES variables there is something about the Hispanic communities that made them experience 
more fertility declines than counties with a high White or Black population. The White variable 
had a smaller standardized coefficient (β = -.041) than the Black variable (-.160). The data 
suggests the counties that were majority white experienced less fertility decline than counties 
with high Black and Hispanic populations. This data is consistent with findings in Table 8, where 
before taking other variables into account, populations with a high White population experienced 
less fertility decline.  
The relationship of median household income and college degree obtainment in this 
regression table is consistent with findings in the previous regressions. In Model 5, both median 
income (β = -.066) and residents with college degrees (β = -.049) have negative co-efficient with 
fertility change. However, adding the fertility 2010 variable in Model 6 results in the co-efficient 
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for median household income to shift to a positive coefficient (β = .115) and the college degree 
obtainment continues to have a negative co-efficient (β = -.283). 
The independent variable in Model 5 were able to explain less of the variable in 
explaining fertility change (R2 = .062) than it did on fertility 2010 (R2 = .18) and fertility 2018 
(R2 = .194). The predictor variables for fertility were less effective for explaining the percent 
change in fertility across the observed time period because the fertility loss occurring across the 
country is universal. Fertility declines are occurring across all parts of the countries, for all races 
and both metropolitan and rural counties. Even if a fertility rate was high in one part of the 
country in 2010, it is still experiencing some decline in 2018. Given how widespread fertility 
declines have been throughout this paper, it is little surprise that predicting change in fertility 
over the period would be difficult. This finding underscores the general conclusion in this paper, 
that a fertility decline occurred for virtually all segments of the population in all regions of the 





 Fertility is rapidly declining across the United States. From 2010 to 2018, fertility 
declined by 9.5%. The decline in fertility rates began in 2008, and the Great Recession 
accelerated these declines in fertility. These fertility declines caused a loss of over 400,000 births 
per year compared to the 2010 rates. These declines were evident across all observed categories, 
including region, race, SES status, economic types and metropolitan status. Rural counties, 
particularly farming counties, experienced the least fertility decline. Meanwhile, large 
metropolitan areas, particularly those with a high Hispanic population, encountered the biggest 
declines in fertility.  
 The most notable aspect of this drop is fertility is that it is difficult to mathematically 
explain what is causing this decline. For fertility rates, variables for region, metropolitan status, 
economic type, race and SES can explain 18% and 19.4% for 2010 and 2018 fertility. However, 
these same variables are only able to explain 6.5% of the change in fertility rates. Over the 
observed period, variables that were strong predictors of above average fertility in 2010, such as 
farming counties and counties in the South, remained strong indicators in 2018, even though 
fertility declined even in these types of counties. Meanwhile, areas that had below average 
fertility in 2010, such as Northeastern counties, still had below average fertility in 2018. Over the 
observed time period, there was a widespread drop in average fertility, and a substantial drop in 
fertility in the nation. This shift could indicate that fertility within the United States is 
fundamentally changing, and that women are likely to continue to have fewer children as part of 
a societal shift toward smaller families than generations prior. This data also suggests that at least 
some of these diminished number of births are likely to be births foregone, and that a delayed 
baby bump as part of the economic recovery after a period of hardship is not coming.  
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 Studies regarding the general fertility rate and total fertility rate indicate that they are at 
the lowest point in United States history (Livingston 2019, Johnson 2020, Martin et al. 2019). 
This study contributes to the literature on fertility by demonstrating that this decline in fertility is 
sweeping across the country, affecting different kinds of counties. No variable analyzed in this 
study showed an increase in fertility rate or in number of births from 2010 to 2018.  
From 1976 to 2014, it became more common for women to have 0-2 children. 
Meanwhile, the share of women who had four or more children born has plummeted (Livingston 
2015). The decline in fertility could well represent a change in United States culture, where even 
smaller families becomes the norm. The trends in fertility observed in this study also shows that 
the total number of births in the country is declining, which has significant implications for 
future generations of Americans.  
 If this shrinking fertility is sustained the next generational cohort of Americans could be 
smaller than the one before. This has significant social ramifications as it could lead to school 
districts to close schools and raise questions about whether a shrinking workforce could support 
a growing retired population. The United States lacks many family friendly policies, such as paid 
family leave, that might boost fertility rates in the country. However, many developed nations 
such as Germany and Sweden that have instituted strong paid leave programs for new parents 
still have declining fertility rates (Tamir 2019). In congruency with the theory of demographic 
transition, it could mean that the United States is now firmly within Stage 4 of the theory (Tamir 
2019). What this means for the future of the United States population is that it would have to rely 
on immigration to keep it population stable or growing.  
 Without an increase in immigration, the effects of lower fertility could have sweeping 
effects on different parts of the country. Counties with significant Hispanic populations are 
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experiencing a rapid decline in fertility rates. If trends continue, these counties may have to 
grapple with closing schools. Additionally, large metropolitan counties are seeing some of the 
biggest declines in fertility; the number of births decline 8.1% from 2010 to 2018.  
 While immigration and migration will also play a big factor, a smaller generation could 
have a big impact on the workforce. Rural counties in particularly could experience worker 
shortages in the coming decades. These counties are experiencing birth declines just like 
metropolitan counties, however they are also seeing a shrinking population of women 
childbearing age, while metropolitan counties are seeing an increase. Rural counties frequently 
have notable portions of their young adult population move away from home. If rural counties 
are not able to entice their childbearing age population to stay in the counties, it could create a 
worker shortage with a smaller generational cohort. If immigration is restricted or reduced into 
the United States, population in the country will decline. 
Following the route of many modern societies, the United States federal government 
could institute several policies to make parenting easier for young Americans across the country. 
Providing universal daycare could be an avenue to ensure that parents can easily integrate 
themselves back into the workforce while their children get a good foundational pre-education 
and begin building social skills (Collins 2019). Childcare centers can also serve as a socially 
integrating institution for parents and could potentially provide information about helpful 
resources that parents did not previously have access to (Small 2009). Additionally, providing 
government mandated fertility leave could allow both mothers and fathers to spend time with 
their newborn children. Having these laws diminish inequity by allowing lower income workers 
equal access to paid leave and childcare. Parents could be less fearful about retaliation from 
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management over taking leave knowing that it is a government mandated law and that companies 
that do not comply would face repercussions for parental discrimination.  
However, policy decisions alone cannot fix the declining fertility rates. They might not 
be enough to influence the behavior of young people to resume having children at pre-recession 
rates. Many people will not change their behaviors if it does not correspond to their surrounding 
culture (Balbo & Barban 2014). So, the culture surrounding fertility decisions will also have to 
change. If both policy and cultural changes are not achieved, the fertility rate in the United States 
could remain low in years to come. 
Fertility impacts from COVID-19 will not be apparent until 2021. The Bureau of 
Economic Analysis announced that in Q2 2020, the GDP of the country fell 32.9 percent, the 
first full quarter that was affected by COVID-19 (BEA 2020). Based on fertility trends observed 
in this study,  yet another drop in fertility will likely occur due to economic hardships. With no 
end to the pandemic currently in sight, it is likely that another recession could occur from 
COVID-19. With fertility rates not yet recovered from the 2008 Great Recession, further 
declines in fertility could create a significantly smaller generational cohort in the United States. 
Analysis of 2021 and 2022 birth data will provide more insights into the impact of the COVID-
19 pandemic and resulting economic disruption will cause another drop in fertility. Any short-
term recovery in fertility to pre-recession levels, appears unlikely given the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
The continued decline in fertility has put the United States firmly in Stage 4 of the 
demographic transition theory, and immigration is what will prevent the country from entering a 
state of population decline. The effects of the Great Recession sped up declining fertility by 
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diminishing the economically viable to have children for many Americans. A similar decline in 
fertility is evident in European countries as well (Tamir 2019).  
 Future research could continue to examine the causes and consequences of diminished 
fertility. The American Community Survey has a wide variety of variables that could expand the 
regression analysis. Some variables that were not included in this study that could be examined 
include access to health insurance, child poverty rates and marital status. While these variables 
might modestly improve the model, it is unlikely to lead to substantially different conclusions 
because variables such as race, SES, and region are closely associated with these potential 
variables. Fertility is a complex issue impacted by a variety of personal, social and economic 
factors. It is possible that this represents a cultural shift toward smaller families that is happening 
across the country and impacting broad parts of the population regardless of the characteristics of 
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